



SAFEMODE

Strengthening synergies between Aviation and Maritime
in the area of Human Factors towards achieving more
efficient and resilient MODES of transportation.



Data quality and trust for Safety Learning Culture

*Transport Maritime Hub. Psychology
and Safety*

New Zealand, 24 August 2022

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1. WMU in a nutshell
2. Safety Learning Culture-SAFEMODE H2020 EU Project
3. Data quality is important & trust is fundamental
4. Conclusions & way ahead



1- WMU in a nutshell



Established in 1983 within the framework of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), a Specialized Agency of the United Nations

MISSION

To be the world centre of excellence in **postgraduate maritime and oceans education, professional training and research**, while **building global capacity** and promoting sustainable development

VISION


To inspire leadership and innovation for a sustainable maritime and oceans future



5,634 Alumni


171 Countries and Territories

1,254 Female Graduates







2- Safety Learning Culture. SAFEMODE H2020 EU Project



- Scarcity of HF & organizational data derived from the investigation of safety events
- Data and available techniques are rarely applied at the design and safety assessment stages
- Need of effective feedback loops from operators/end users back to designers



SAFEMODE Project Consortium




Leaders & participants of the safety learning culture work




What does Just and Learning Culture look like in Shipping?


There needs to be a **Culture** framework put in place in Maritime to facilitate **reporting**, and thus **learning**

Guidance might be based on leading edge work ongoing in the aviation domain






Investigation



Understanding Human Element




Reporting




Near miss Reporting


Investigator and Seafarer interviews & maritime leaders discussions




What keeps ship safe




Safety Management System



Just Culture




Safety Learning




Investigation

- Conflicting objectives in accident investigation (e.g., learning or prosecuting)
- Lack of **trustful relationship** (e.g., investigators vs. seafarers)
- Organizational and structural issues scarcely investigated



Understanding
Human Element

- Insufficient knowledge in Human Factors
- Focus on individual not on the system
- Too much focus on procedural compliance




Reporting

- Difficulty in making reports
- Unfavorable mindset to reporting
- Reporting purpose (e.g., blaming or learning?)
- **Mistrust** shore-ship




Near miss
Reporting

- Negative **feedback** on near miss reporting
- Focus on satisfaction of indicators more than **quality of reporting**
- Reporting system itself: easiness, use of information
- Lack of tools and resources to analyse reporting




What keeps
ship safe

- Professionalism of crew and training of individual
- Resilience and flexibility
- Balance between experience (crew) and procedures (company)
- Procedures do not take into account the **realities** of the **operation context**




Safety Management
System

- Lack of positive **feedback**, seen as burdensome
- Too **generic**, does not properly integrate operational demands
- Gap in **understanding** between onshore departments (SMS) and ship (operational context)
- Learning processes do not mean Learning Culture




Just Culture

- **Blame** and **punishment** hinders learning
- Unstable working conditions
- Need for a systems perspective
- Need for **trust** and **cooperation**



Safety Learning

- Investigator provides facts to learn from
- Investigations recommendations not sufficiently applied
- Reluctance to consider **organizational factors**





Based on the original SAFEMODE Safety Learning Cycle, 10 ways of learning has been developed, that can be applied equally to both aviation and maritime systems.




Data Capture

Any events, incidents, accidents and near misses are reported and investigated using effective systems, language and processes.

Operation & Maintenance

Normal and abnormal operations are monitored constantly for performance variations and safety exceedances



Data Analysis

Data are analysed to determine causes, contributions, and remedial measures to prevent recurrence

Safety Learning


Specific and generic lessons are drawn to improve safety, including via job and interface design, automation, and improved risk assurance processes

Risk-Informed Design / Deep Learning

Designers and risk assessors are able to use the lessons learned to make future systems more resilient. Organizational and systemic Human Factors issues are addressed


Data Capture

1. Common Language (Taxonomy)
2. Investigating Differently



Data Analysis

3. Evidence Base/Learning Platform
4. Ten Most Wanted




Investigating Differently

- *People deserve confidentiality*
- *People deserve to be heard out*
- *People deserve to be involved in the process*
- *Learning comes from a two-way dialogue*
- *People should be treated fairly, irrespective of how much the damage cost*
- *Investigators need to understand 'how the job is done around here'*



Data Capture

1. Common Language (Taxonomy)
2. Investigating Differently




Data Analysis


3. Evidence Base / Learning Platform
4. Ten Most Wanted

Safety Learning

5. Group Learning Review
6. Deep Dives
7. Safety Intelligence Sharing
8. Safety Alliances/Safety Forums



Safety Deep Dives



- Explore a specific accident or incident trend
- Examine the basis for safety
- Which barriers are still working?
- Which barriers are no longer working?
- What are the key Human Factors involved (both positive and negative?)
- Have any external factors changed?
- Have internal factors changed (staffing, competency, etc.)?
- Are the procedures still fit for purpose?
- What are the deep systemic factors?
- Where are the hotspots in the fleet?
- Where are there best practices in the fleet?
- What can be shared across the fleet?

- Data Capture**
1. Common Language (Taxonomy)
 2. Investigating Differently



Data Analysis

3. Evidence Base / Learning Platform
4. Ten Most Wanted

Safety Learning


5. Group Learning Review
6. Deep Dives
7. Safety Intelligence Sharing
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Deep Learning

9. Reverse Swiss Cheese Theory
10. Human Factors Toolkit

Where are the holes in my organization's Swiss Cheese?

Economy, Pressures, Laws, Regulations, Societal Trends



- To choose **learn over blame**
- To build **trust** and improve **operational safety**
- To obtain more **accurate and consistent understanding** of the critical factors leading to incidents and accidents
- To avoid incidents and accidents via more **systemic accident prevention strategies** that go beyond isolated events
- To ensure **learning occur at all levels**, whether on the ship, onshore, across the fleet, across a segment of the industry, or throughout the industry as a whole





3- Data quality is important and Trust is fundamental



- From **accident investigations**. Reactive and based on accident reports (feedback)

Systematic collection and analysis of HF data from safety events, its categorization through a **HF taxonomy**, and use for **new human factors risk models**

How investigations are conducted, investigation focus on “who” or “**why**”, **data quality and reliability, work realities**




Post



Pre

- From **near-misses & incidents reporting**: Proactive and based on feedback from reporters (feedforward)

Development of a **Culture framework** in which operators are not punished for their honest mistakes and accountability exists but **encourages anticipation by sharing Trust**, reporting is not an artefact but a reality, a **participatory approach**, reporting culture oriented to optimize interfaces, correcting and detecting dangerous environments



(The Trust loop. Adapted from C. Lloyd, 2021)


(The Fear loop. Adapted from C. Lloyd, 2021)



4- Conclusions & way ahead



- ✓ Focus on **workplace realities experienced**
- ✓ Search for **data quality**, validity, reliability
- ✓ Support **qualitative research** to complement numbers
- ✓ Choose **learning** over blaming
- ✓ Build **trust** (ability, honesty, care) and enhance **cooperation** (seafarers/shore-management/authorities) for quality feedback
- ✓ Develop **systemic approach** (feedforward)
- ✓ Learning is everywhere: participation based on **trust** and a **caring** environment!



2022
Public release event



2022
Industry forums,
capacity building
training, research
publishing

2022
Paper submission
to IMO

‘For the common goal of improving safety at sea, we must cast aside our competitive instincts and share knowledge and experience on safety performance’

Knut Ørbeck-Nilssen, DNV Chief Executive Maritime
(Lloyd’s List 19 December 2021)

Thanks for your attention

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